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The Chilling Effect of Governance-by-Data
on Data Markets
Niva Elkin-Koren† & Michal S. Gal††
Big data has become an important resource not only for commerce but also for
governance. Governance-by-data seeks to take advantage of the bulk of data collected
by private firms to make law enforcement more efficient. It can take many forms,
including setting enforcement priorities, affecting methods of proof, and even chang-
ing the content of legal norms. For instance, car manufacturers can use real-time
data on the driving habits of drivers to learn how their cars respond to different
driving patterns. If shared with the government, the same data can be used to en-
force speed limits or even to craft personalized speed limits for each driver.
The sharing of data for the purpose of law enforcement raises obvious concerns
for civil liberties. Indeed, over the past two decades, scholars have focused on the
risks arising from such data sharing for privacy and freedom. So far, however, the
literature has generally overlooked the implications of such dual use of data for data
markets and data-driven innovation.
In this Essay, we argue that governance-by-data may create chilling effects
that could distort data collection and data-driven innovation. We challenge the as-
sumptions that incentives to collect data are a given and that firms will continue to
collect data notwithstanding governmental access to such data. We show that, in
some instances, an inverse relationship exists between incentives for collecting data
and sharing it for the purpose of governance. Moreover, the incentives of data sub-
jects to allow the collection of data by private entities might also change, thereby
potentially affecting the efficiency of data-driven markets and, subsequently,
data-driven innovation. As a result, data markets might not provide sufficient and
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adequate data to support digital governance. This, in turn,might significantly affect
welfare.
INTRODUCTION
Big data has become an important resource not only in the
commercial sphere but also in the legal one. Governance-by-data
can take many forms, including setting enforcement priorities,
affecting methods of proof, and even changing the content of legal
norms. Private entities play a central role in collecting and
analyzing such data. Indeed, successful implementation of
governance-by-data may depend on the potential dual use of data
as a commercial asset, generated by the private sector, and as an
intrinsic measure of governance.1
The interplay between private and public uses of the same
data has important implications for social welfare. Over the past
two decades, scholars have identified the growing role private
firms play in facilitating governmental access to data,2 analyzed
the incentives of private companies to collaborate with govern-
mental surveillance,3 and explored the implications of such data
sharing for civil liberties.4
This literature, however, has generally overlooked the impli-
cations of the dual use of data for data markets. The current lit-
erature largely assumes that incentives to collect data are a given
and that firms will continue to collect data while simply erecting
1 Some of the arguments raised also apply, to some extent, to governance-by-data
performed by private firms. For instance, “interactive life insurance,” which was recently
announced by the life insurance company John Hancock, offers policyholders discounted
premiums provided that they wear a tracking device that monitors their health. The col-
lection of data intends to affect people’s behavior, incentivizing healthier living and, con-
sequently, reducing the cost for the life insurance company. See Suzanne Barlyn, Strap
On the Fitbit: John Hancock to Sell Only Interactive Life Insurance (Reuters, Sept 19,
2018), archived at http://perma.cc/JNJ3-EVFV. We leave this issue for future discussion.
2 See, for example, Christopher L. Izant, Note, Equal Access to Public Communica-
tions Data for Social Media Surveillance Software, 31 Harv J L & Tech 237, 238–40 (2017);
Michael D. Birnhack and Niva Elkin-Koren, The Invisible Handshake: The Reemergence
of the State in the Digital Environment, 8 Va J L & Tech 6, 18–28 (2003).
3 See, for example, Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Surveillance Intermediaries, 70 Stan L Rev
99, 112–22 (2018).
4 See, for example, Developments in the Law: More Data, More Problems, 131 Harv
L Rev 1714, 1729–36 (2018); Steven I. Friedland, Drinking from the Fire Hose: How Mas-
sive Self-Surveillance from the Internet of Things Is Changing the Face of Privacy, 119 W
Va L Rev 891, 906–12 (2017); Niva Elkin-Koren and Eldar Haber, Governance by Proxy:
Cyber Challenges to Civil Liberties, 82 Brooklyn L Rev 105, 131–43 (2016); Jon D.
Michaels, All the President’s Spies: Private-Public Intelligence Partnerships in the War on
Terror, 96 Cal L Rev 901, 929–41 (2008).
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higher barriers to governmental access to such data. We chal-
lenge this assumption: once governance-by-data is introduced, in-
centives for data collection might change. But more fundamen-
tally, incentives of data subjects to allow private entities to collect
their data might also change, thereby potentially affecting the ef-
ficiency of data-driven markets and data-driven innovation. This,
in turn, might significantly affect welfare. Furthermore, granting
government access to privately collected data might harm the
very foundation on which governance-by-data relies. This dy-
namic effect must be recognized and analyzed before we can make
informed choices and ensure that governmental governance-by-
data indeed increases welfare.
To elaborate on this claim, this Essay focuses on one form of
governance-by-data, personalized law, recognizing that many ar-
guments about it have relevance for other forms of governance-
by-data as well. Personalized law seeks to take advantage of tech-
nological advances in data collection and data science, which
allow data to be transferred, stored, organized, and analyzed in
an efficient and timely manner, in order to tailor legal norms to
individuals. For instance, rather than setting a single speed limit
that applies to all drivers, speed limits might be personally tai-
lored to individual drivers based on their experience, driving his-
tory, or real-time road conditions. Or disabled parking permits
could be issued to individuals based on relevant temporary or per-
manent health conditions or family circumstances (for example,
driving young children). Such tailored norms could be embedded
in the digital infrastructure (such as autonomous cars, smart
parking facilities, and roads) and could be individually applied in
real time by enabling parking, issuing a ticket, or even remotely
disabling a car following a warning.5
Personalized law may increase efficiency by improving law
enforcement, reducing under- or overinclusive risk avoidance
mechanisms, and reducing institutionalized discrimination.6 At
5 For other examples of tailored norms in the driving context, see Anthony J. Casey
and Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and Standards, 92 Ind L J 1401, 1416–17 (2017).
6 See Omri Ben-Shahar and Ariel Porat, Personalizing Negligence Law, 91 NYU L
Rev 627, 646–67 (2016); Ariel Porat and Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default
Rules and Disclosure with Big Data, 112 Mich L Rev 1417, 1470–76 (2014). See also Jane
Bambauer, Other People’s Papers, 94 Tex L Rev 205, 242–57 (2015).
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the same time, however, personalized law may undermine im-
portant values, raising concerns regarding privacy, equality un-
der the law, and civil liberties.7
To fulfill its promises, personalized law requires governmen-
tal access to its main inputs, namely relevant data and algorithms
that can turn that data into a governing tool. Indeed, the more
personalized the law, the more accurate and personal the data
required. This implies a change not only in the volume of data
needed for tailoring the legal norm but also in its quality, includ-
ing its variety, velocity, and veracity.8
While some of this data can be collected from government-
controlled data sources (such as speed cameras), the bulk of the
data is likely to be collected by private firms (for example, data
on driving patterns collected from sensors in cars, operated by the
car manufacturers; locational data collected by mobile phone ap-
plications; or real-time health data generated by wearables).
Privately produced data is a primary resource, asset, and
product of the digital economy. Its high commercial value arises
from the fact that it allows for regularized customization of
decision-making, thereby reducing risk and improving perfor-
mance. Among other things, it enables firms to make more
profitable investment, pricing, and marketing decisions and to
create new or improved products and services in response to indi-
vidual demand. Accordingly, numerous firms are investing in col-
lecting, organizing, and analyzing data or in creating products,
services, and technologies that rely on such data, giving rise to
data capitalism.9
7 See Julia Angwin, et al, Machine Bias (ProPublica, May 23, 2016), archived at
http://perma.cc/MCJ5-HGU3; Big Data: A Tool for Inclusion or Exclusion? *9–11 (Federal
Trade Commission, Jan 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/Q39G-NKZD; Daniel J. Solove,
Nothing to Hide: The False Tradeoff between Privacy and Security 182–94 (Yale 2011). For
the purposes of this Essay, we do not question the desirability of personalized law.
8 Take, for instance, the data required to tailor speed limits to specific drivers. The
data may include information about the specific circumstances (for example, weather con-
ditions or the presence of an emergency), the general traits of the driver (for example,
young, new, or repeat offender), and even her specific driving abilities and patterns (for
example, her reactions to changing road conditions, eyesight, or a tendency to drive reck-
lessly). As this example indicates, the application of personalized law requires more per-
sonal data and different types of data than currently required to enforce a speed limit.
Furthermore, it may require a combination of different data sources in order to acquire
the relevant information or to verify its accuracy.
9 For examples of data capitalism and discussion of its social implications, see
Shoshana Zuboff, Big Other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of an Information
Civilization, 30 J Info Tech 75, 81–85 (2015).
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Can personalized laws, which heavily rely on data collected
by private firms, coexist with a vibrant market for data collection
and the resultant data-driven innovation?
This Essay argues that, although data is nonrivalrous and its
costs of transfer are usually low, collecting, organizing, storing,
and sharing some types of data could be costly.10 As a result, some
data intermediaries might enjoy market power. Therefore, it
cannot be assumed that data will be shared with the government
at low, competitive prices. This consideration affects the feasibil-
ity and efficiency of governance-by-data.
More importantly, we argue that governance-by-data may
create an inherent tension and sometimes even a clash with data
capitalism. Once introduced, it may affect the markets for data
on which it relies, thereby changing the current status quo. We
identify and analyze four dimensions in which governance-by-
data may change the dynamics of data-driven markets: 1) the
quantity of data collected; 2) the quality of data collected; 3) the
use of efficient technologies that build on ongoing analysis of data;
and, resultantly and most importantly, 4) data-driven innovation.
These effects, in turn, are likely to affect the efficiency of data-
driven markets as well as the feasibility and efficacy of personal-
ized laws that depend on such data.
These effects result from the fact that the introduction of
governance-by-data may lead to self-applied limitations on data
provision, collection, and sharing; chilling effects in data markets;
and knock-on domino effects in markets for products and services
that rely on such data. Some data subjects—whether private in-
dividuals or legal entities—might limit their use of devices that
collect data or provide inaccurate, partial, or “noisy” data, thereby
affecting the quantity and quality of data available. This, in turn,
may lower the incentives of data collectors to share data with the
government or even to generate data that may be used for the
purpose of governance in the first place.11 Such impediments to
extracting data or erosion in the quality of data may result in
downgrading data-driven innovation and may negatively affect
10 For earlier formulations of this argument, see, for example, Julie E. Cohen and
William M. Martin, Intellectual Property Rights in Data, in Deanna J. Richards, Braden
R. Allenby, and W. Dale Compton, eds, Information Systems and the Environment 45,
52–54 (National Academy 2001); J.H. Reichman and Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual
Property Rights in Data?, 50 Vand L Rev 51, 70–72 (1997).
11 See Part III.B.1.
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dynamic efficiency, which is the main engine of modern econo-
mies, thereby possibly reducing social welfare.
The Essay proceeds as follows: Part I sets the stage by briefly
introducing personalized law as a form of governance-by-data and
the necessary conditions for its efficient functioning. It also
briefly explores the characteristics of markets for data. Part II
analyzes a potential source of tension between data capitalism
and personalized law: the price of the data. Part III focuses on a
more significant manifestation of this tension: distortions in the
operation of data markets, including in the quantity and quality
of data collected, and the implications for the use of data-based
devices and for data-driven innovation. The Conclusion briefly ex-
plores some regulatory and technological tools to address these
inherent tensions.
I. PERSONALIZED LAW AND DATA RESOURCES
Personalized law seeks to take advantage of the proliferation
of data to make law enforcement more efficient. For instance,
modern cars can collect real-time data on driving patterns. Car
manufacturers can use this data to learn how their cars respond
to different driving patterns. If shared with the government, the
same data can be used to craft personalized speed limits for each
driver. To take another example, firms collect data on individuals’
risk levels. Such data can be used to price products (for example,
insurance) or to customize marketing (for example, fast cars). The
same data can be used to complete an incomplete contract signed
by the individual, which requires an assessment of her risk level.
Personalized laws therefore seek to utilize fine-grained data
on individuals in order to develop and apply personally tailored
legal norms. This Part explores the sources and characteristics of
such data.
A. Sources of Data
Two distinct sources of data may be needed to employ person-
alized law: data collected by the government and data collected
by private firms. Data from the two sources does not always over-
lap. For example, the government collects data from speeding
cameras, censuses, and tax returns. Some of this data may be
unique, and some may be similar to that collected by private
firms. The data collected by the government may not always be
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sufficient to craft personalized laws.12 In these cases, the govern-
ment might invest resources in collecting such data or opt to ac-
quire data collected by private firms.13 Indeed, digital communi-
cation, data collection, and data storage are currently dominated
by private firms. In some cases, a combination of data from gov-
ernmental and private sources might be necessary.
B. Markets for Data
Data is an important driver in today’s economy. The growth
in computing and storage power combined with increased and
more efficient internet access have spurred the advent of the dig-
ital economy and enabled the rise of business models based on the
collection and processing of large quantities of data (big data).14
The ability to store, arrange, and analyze data using sophis-
ticated algorithms in order to gain insights is what gives data its
enormous financial value and power.15 The analysis of data allows
for regularized customization of decision-making, thereby reduc-
ing risk and improving performance. Big data also enables the
introduction of new products, such as self-driving cars and smart
cities, thereby generating large gains for business, consumers,
and society as a whole.16
Personal data plays a key role in this economy. It is used to
find correlations that enable prediction of overall trends as well
as individual preferences and behavior. It can also be used to cre-
ate a “digital profile” for each individual, which could then be used
12 Determining the optimal level of data collection is beyond the scope of this Essay.
We note only that the logic of data capitalism, which involves customization and prediction
based on big data analysis, assumes that more data is better. See Zuboff, 30 J Info Tech
at 77–79 (cited in note 9). Yet collecting too much data could lead to inefficiency if firms
fail to leverage all this data into products, services, or business innovation. How Big Data
and AI Are Driving Business Innovation *17 (NewVantage Partners LLC, 2018), archived
at http://perma.cc/7UUQ-XZNG.
13 Self-collection by the government has its own limitations. It could involve duplica-
tive or costly data collection, or it could be impossible (if, for example, data results from a
unique interaction that does not involve the government).
14 Council of Economic Advisors, Big Data and Differential Pricing *8–13 (Executive
Office of the President, Feb 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/FZE4-YDZ9. Data collection
is also affected by the willingness of users to provide their personal information in return
for digital services.
15 McKinsey & Co estimated that data mining by firms increases operating margins
by 60 percent. James Manyika, et al, Big Data: The Next Frontier for Innovation, Compe-
tition, and Productivity *2 (McKinsey Global Institute, May 2011), archived at
http://perma.cc/8ACA-TPE4.
16 Data-Driven Innovation: Big Data for Growth and Well-Being 177–207 (OECD
2015). See also Big Data and Differential Pricing at *8–15 (cited in note 14).
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to improve personalized products and services or for microtar-
geted advertising.17
Data markets consist of three main links18 along the data
value chain, depicted in Figure 1: collection; synthesis and
analysis; and use.
FIGURE 1: THE DATA VALUE CHAIN
Collection relates to the extraction of the data and its datafi-
cation, namely the recording, aggregation, and organization of in-
formation into a form that can be used for data mining.19
Synthesis and analysis relate to the integration of different types
of data and to the analytical processing of data in order to find
correlations. It transforms the raw data into meaningful infor-
mation. The last link, use, involves utilizing data-based infor-
mation for prediction and decision-making in relevant markets.
The outputs of these activities may include improved or innova-
tive processes, products, or services. This value chain also has a
dynamic internal reciprocal dimension, in which data regarding
the success of the algorithm’s past predictions is collected and
used to “teach” the algorithm to be more accurate so that it can
make better predictions in the future.20 The characteristics of data
17 See Zuboff, 30 J Info Tech at 78–79 (cited in note 9).
18 We disregard here the market for data storage. See Daniel L. Rubinfeld and
Michal S. Gal, Access Barriers to Big Data, 59 Ariz L Rev 339, 363–64 (2017) (discussing
three types of barriers to data storage).
19 See Katherine J. Strandburg, Monitoring, Datafication, and Consent: Legal Ap-
proaches to Privacy in the Big Data Context, in Julia Lane, et al, eds, Privacy, Big Data,
and the Public Good: Frameworks for Engagement 5, 10–12 (Cambridge 2014) (discussing
the three basic modes of data acquisition); Helen Nissenbaum, Deregulating Collection:
Must Privacy Give Way to Use Regulation?, in Michael X. Delli Carpini, ed, Digital Media
and Democratic Futures *8–9 (forthcoming 2019), archived at http://perma.cc/HP4A-T2G2
(discussing the view that data is not simply a raw resource, lying about awaiting collection
but rather is “constructed or created from the signals of countless technical devices and
systems”).
20 Harry Surden, Machine Learning and Law, 89 Wash L Rev 87, 89–95 (2014).
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and the markets for its collection, analysis, and use affect how it
is provided.
Sources of data vary. One major source, which is character-
ized by fierce competition, is users’ online attention.21 Several
business models for collecting such data have emerged, some of
which are based on an implicit or explicit exchange with data sub-
jects: users allow firms to access (some of) their private data in
exchange for various benefits (for example, apps, content, ser-
vices).22 Some firms have developed into “mega” data collectors,
with direct and significant access to digital users (for example,
Google, Facebook, and Amazon).23 Some data is collected as a by-
product of other productive activities, such as sensors embedded
in “things” (for example, cars, appliances, wearables, and digital
butlers).
Some types of data are collected by numerous firms at low
cost (for example, smartphone users’ location data). Moreover,
similar data can be collected from different sources (for example,
location data can be collected from wearables or smartphones).24
Yet the costs of data collection are not always low, and the mar-
kets for it are not always competitive. As Professors Daniel
Rubinfeld and Michal Gal show, markets for certain types of data
are characterized by high entry barriers.25 Some of these barriers
reflect exclusive access points (for example, patient data collected
by doctors) or the point in time that a firm started gathering data
(for example, a collection of aerial maps before a natural disaster).
Barriers to competition over data may also arise from scale and
scope economies in data collection, organization, storage, or
analysis;26 from network effects (for example, Facebook and
Yelp);27 from legal limitations on data transfer (for example, shar-
ing a person’s medical history without consent);28 from lock-in and
21 See generally Tim Wu, The Attention Merchants: The Epic Scramble to Get inside
Our Heads (Knopf 2016).
22 See Michal S. Gal and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Hidden Costs of Free Goods:
Implications for Antitrust Enforcement, 80 Antitrust L J 521, 527 (2016) (explaining the
reciprocal consumer-supplier relationship in the context of Google).
23 See Justus Haucap and Ulrich Heimeshoff, Google, Facebook, Amazon, eBay: Is
the Internet Driving Competition or Market Monopolization?, 11 J Intl Econ & Econ Pol
49, 54–60 (2014).
24 See Rubinfeld and Gal, 59 Ariz L Rev at 346–47 (cited in note 18).
25 Id at 369–70.
26 Id at 352–55.
27 Id at 355–56.
28 Rubinfeld and Gal, 59 Ariz L Rev at 359–62 (cited in note 18).
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switching costs when past data is important;29 and from barriers
to data compatibility and interoperability.30 Fierce competition
over users’ attention may increase the need to create costly prod-
ucts or services that capture such attention. Finally, when data
is a by-product of other activities, the collector must engage in the
relevant activities.31
The link in the data value chain consisting of synthesis and
analysis is often characterized by economies of scale and scope.
The information that can be gleaned from data is positively cor-
related with the attributes of the data collected (volume, velocity,
variety, and veracity),32 at least up to a point.33 Thus, identifying
patterns, generating predictions, and promptly adapting to rap-
idly changing circumstances often require the availability of large
quantities of fresh, varied, and accurate data. Interestingly, and
relevant to the analysis below, the correlations found in data
analysis are not necessarily trivial.
Finally, with regard to use, the nonrivalrous nature of data
implies that the same data can have a variety of uses.34 Moreover,
if data exists in digital form, the marginal cost of sharing collected
data with other entities can be very low. At the same time, data
is often not fungible.35 Different types of data may be needed for
different markets. For example, when velocity is of high
importance, old data cannot serve as a sufficiently effective input.
How might data markets be affected by the introduction of
personalized law? This is the focus of the next two Parts.
II. THE PRICE OF DATA
The feasibility and efficacy of governance-by-data depend,
among other things, on the price that the government must pay for
access to data. The literature discussing personalized law tends
29 Id at 364.
30 Id at 365.
31 Id at 377.
32 See Mark Lycett, Datafication: Making Sense of (Big) Data in a Complex World,
22 Eur J Info Sys 381, 381–82 (2013); Supporting Investment in Knowledge Capital,
Growth and Innovation 324–25 (OECD 2013); President’s Council of Advisors on Science
and Technology, Big Data and Privacy: A Technological Perspective *2 (Executive Office
of the President, May 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/K49W-CWZ8.
33 See Rubinfeld and Gal, 59 Ariz L Rev at 352–55 (cited in note 18).
34 See Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability *14 (Federal Trade
Commission, May 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/WJ3L-9XN3 (discussing how multi-
ple data brokers share and sell the same sources of data to consumers).
35 See id at 23–35. See also Maurice E. Stucke and Allen P. Grunes, Big Data and
Competition Policy 79 (Oxford 2016).
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to implicitly assume that markets for data are competitive and
that its price would not create a barrier for accessing it. It is gen-
erally assumed that data produced by the private sector will be
voluntarily shared with the government for governing purposes
(hereinafter: “data sharing”) at low, competitive prices and that
such dual use will increase overall efficiency and social welfare.36
In the real world, these conditions do not always hold, and
the price for data may be high. As noted above, while the cost of
sharing data, once collected, may be low, collecting data may in-
volve high costs.37 Collection costs may increase further if person-
alized law requires data that is not regularly collected by the mar-
ket due to differing incentives regarding the type of data collected,
the frequency of collection, and ways of organizing the data. For
example, if the costs of data collection or analysis are high, a firm
might decide to sample the data only once a day. To apply person-
alized law, however, sampling might need to be more frequent. Or
take data organization. Governance-by-data may require combin-
ing several sources of data and synchronizing data in order to en-
sure that similar legal principles apply to all. Creating data
standards for interoperability and ensuring compliance with such
standards may be costly.38 When all competitors incur high collec-
tion costs, the market price must cover such costs, at least in the
long run.
In addition, some data collectors might enjoy significant com-
parative advantages, and even exclusivity, in the collection of cer-
tain types of data. This, in turn, might create significant market
power over such data. Observe that the more specific the person-
alized law, the more specific the data need to be and, thus, the
increased likelihood that it will not be available from many
sources. In such cases, the price requested by private firms for
sharing data might be high, reflecting their market power. More-
over, the price required might reflect and capture at least some of
the positive externalities that the use of the data for personalized
law will create on social welfare, thereby further increasing its
price. Furthermore, when the application of personalized law
requires data from several separate sources, an anticommons
36 See note 6.
37 See Part I.B.
38 Such standards can also create a chilling effect on some forms of innovation if, for
example, they impose higher costs on smaller data collectors than on large ones. Michal
S. Gal and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Data Standardization, 94 NYU L Rev *4 (forthcoming
2019), archived at http://perma.cc/KK5R-EKVN.
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problem might arise.39 The price of data may also reflect lost com-
mercial opportunities resulting from the use of data for govern-
ance purposes.40 Finally, it might reflect the loss data collectors
might suffer from harm to their self-portrayal as “champions of
user privacy in the face of government surveillance.”41
For the reasons we explore above, the price of data may be
socially suboptimal, and some of the welfare benefits of personal-
ized law could be lost. Observe, however, that the price paid by
the government for data might increase incentives for data collec-
tion, which in turn could increase competition for the provision of
data, at least in some markets. The price of data sharing might
then be reduced.
The analysis thus far shows that the provision of personal-
ized law might be suboptimal given the price that the government
might need to pay for the data. When the price is too high, the
government will simply not buy the data and will refrain from
governance-by-data. Sometimes, however, this might not be opti-
mal. This might be the case when the government is locked into
a policy of personalized law (for example, it has applied it to some
citizens and now needs to apply it to others), and the price for the
data rises. This might happen, for example, if the government is
technologically locked in to certain supplier(s) of data due to the
length and costs of the process for vetting new data suppliers,
first-mover advantages in creating interfaces for the use of data,
and barriers relating to the inclusion of new types of data in ex-
isting systems.
III. DISTORTIONS IN DATA MARKETS
Personalized law seeks to take advantage of the proliferation
of data to make law enforcement more efficient. Because data is
39 See Michael A. Heller and Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Science 698, 698 (1998) (defining the “trag-
edy of the anticommons” as when “multiple owners each have a right to exclude others
from a scarce resource and no one has an effective privilege of use”).
40 At the same time, governance-by-data may create new business opportunities for
some firms. ChoicePoint, Inc, for example, also offered its data services to the government,
“enabl[ing] police to download comprehensive dossiers on almost any adult.” Chris Jay
Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and Other Commercial Data
Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for Law Enforcement, 29 NC J Intl L & Comm Reg
595, 595 (2004).
41 Rozenshtein, 70 Stan L Rev at 145 (cited in note 3).
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nonrivalrous and its use by the government generally does not ex-
haust or harm its commercial utility, it is presumed that data shar-
ing for law enforcement purposes would increase social welfare.
This Part challenges this presumption. It argues that data
sharing may create chilling effects that could distort data and
data-driven markets. While the previous Part generally assumes
that the extent of data collection by private firms is largely a
given, we show that, in some instances, an inverse relationship
exists between incentives for collecting data and sharing it for the
purpose of governance. As a result, data markets might not pro-
vide sufficient and adequate data to support personalized law.
Graphically, the argument that data sharing adds another
dimension to market dynamics can be illustrated as follows:
FIGURE 2: THE EFFECTS OF DATA SHARING ON THE DATA VALUE
CHAIN
We first explore the potential consequences of personalized
law on the conduct of data subjects. We then explore the likely
effects of such consequences on data market dynamics, focusing
on the quantity and quality of data as well as on the use of data-
driven technologies and on data-driven innovation.
A. Effects on Data Subjects’ Conduct
Personalized law requires the sharing of data with the gov-
ernment on a scale and for purposes not previously known. One
concern is that such data sharing will affect the incentives of data
416 The University of Chicago Law Review [86:403
subjects to make their data available for collection and, result-
antly, the ability and incentives of data collectors to collect data.
A fierce debate exists over whether surveillance by private
firms affects people’s behavior. Behavioral studies point to a
“privacy paradox”—that is, a gap between the high value people
claim to place on privacy and their actual online behavior, which
demonstrates that they are willing to disclose personal data for
relatively small rewards.42 Yet there is little agreement on the
conclusions to be drawn from these studies. Some privacy
scholars explain this paradox by arguing that consumers lack
sufficient information on potential risks involved in disclosing
their personal data or hold misconceptions regarding data
collection, the risks involved, and the existence of alternative
options to data disclosure.43 Others argue, however, that
individuals disclose personal data despite pronounced privacy
concerns because they prefer immediate benefits over abstract
potential risks in the future.44
Furthermore, surveillance has arguably become embedded in
the modern ecosystem of an “always on” society, in which data is
collected on an ongoing basis (for example, sensors in devices
often record data continuously). Therefore, presumably,
personalized law would simply add another layer of use of the
data collected.
Is there any reason to believe that data subjects might
change their behavior if the same data that is used by private
firms were also used for governance-by-data?
While the effects on conduct of increased governmental sur-
veillance for the purposes of personalized law have not, as yet,
been studied, some rough indicators exist.45 The Edward Snowden
42 See, for example, Monika Taddicken, The “Privacy Paradox” in the Social Web: The
Impact of Privacy Concerns, Individual Characteristics, and the Perceived Social
Relevance on Different Forms of Self-Disclosure, 19 J Computer-Mediated Commun 248,
265–68 (2014).
43 See, for example, Spyros Kokolakis, Privacy Attitudes and Privacy Behaviour: A
Review of Current Research on the Privacy Paradox Phenomenon, 64 Computers &
Security 122, 128–30 (2017).
44 See generally, for example, Christian Pieter Hoffmann, Christoph Lutz, and Giulia
Ranzini, Privacy Cynicism: A New Approach to the Privacy Paradox, 10(4) Cyberpsychol-
ogy: J Psychosocial Rsrch on Cyberspace 7 (2016).
45 Measuring a chilling effect is complicated, as it requires proof that people would
have behaved differently but for the surveillance. People’s conduct might also be affected
by their (mis)perceptions of harm. See Oren Bar-Gill, Algorithmic Price Discrimination
When Demand Is a Function of Both Preferences and (Mis)perceptions, 86 U Chi L Rev 217,
219–20 (2019).
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revelations offer a classic example of the use of data collected by
the private sector for governmental surveillance.46 Several studies
found changes in users’ behavior following the Snowden revela-
tions. For instance, Alex Marthews and Professor Catherine
Tucker found decreased use of select sensitive terms in search
queries following the Snowden revelations.47 Another study, con-
ducted by Professor Jonathon Penney, points to a decline in traffic
to privacy-sensitive Wikipedia articles.48
The question arises: How much can we learn from these
studies? The observed changes in behavior might simply reflect
users’ expectations that data collected by private firms will not be
used for government surveillance. As argued by Professor Helen
Nissenbaum, context matters, and data that was shared in one
context cannot be shared in another without violating the
“context-specific substantive norms” that delineate who collects
the data, who it can be shared with, and under what
circumstances.49 In this sense, it might be argued that the
reaction to the Snowden revelations can be partly explained by
the breach of trust produced by the disregard for context-specific
norms.50 Such breaches are of course not at issue when the
sharing of data is transparent and known beforehand.
We argue, however, that, even if data subjects are aware that
their data will be accessed for purposes of personalized law, this
awareness is still likely to transform their behavior. That is be-
cause the use of data for governance adds a new dimension to sur-
veillance, affecting data subjects not only as consumers but also
as citizens. Data collected on a data subject may carry concrete
consequences related to law enforcement, affecting her legal
rights or duties. Even critics who are skeptical that surveillance
46 See Laura K. Donohue, High Technology, Consumer Privacy and U.S. National Se-
curity, 4 Am U Bus L Rev 11, 15–25 (2015); Sam Gustin, NSA Spying Scandal Could Cost
U.S. Tech Giants Billions (Time, Dec 10, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/LZ3D-P65S.
47 Alex Marthews and Catherine Tucker, Government Surveillance and Internet
Search Behavior *16–17 (unpublished manuscript, 2017), archived at
http://perma.cc/2WEH-X4CJ.
48 Jonathon W. Penney, Chilling Effects: Online Surveillance and Wikipedia Use, 31
Berkeley Tech L J 117, 145–61 (2016).
49 Helen Nissenbaum, A Contextual Approach to Privacy Online, 140 Daedalus 32,
32 (Fall 2011). See also generally Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context: Technology,
Policy, and the Integrity of Social Life (Stanford 2009).
50 The same reaction may result from a breach of trust that involves selling the data
to other private firms. See, for example, Taylor Hatmaker, Users Dump AccuWeather
iPhone App after Learning It Sends WB_wombat_location Data to a Third Party
(TechCrunch, Aug 22, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/BTK8-5D6V.
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in and of itself has a chilling effect on behavior agree that a
chilling effect may occur when surveillance increases the risk of
negative consequences.51 This link between data analysis and
sanctions or rewards by the state makes personalized law not
simply an enforcement measure (seeking to tailor standards to
each individual) but also an instrument that could actually shape
the behavior of data subjects.52 Because tailor-made standards
(for example, customized speed limits) could be determined based
on data collected in other contexts (for example, social media), we
may need to rethink assumptions regarding the conduct of data
subjects when data is generated and collected.
The use of data for governance-by-data thus raises concerns
that go beyond harm to privacy. Several factors may lie at the
basis of such a differentiation. These can be classified into
potential consequences of personalized laws and other intangible
implications.
1. Potential consequences for rights and duties.
For users, the government’s use of data might be (perceived
as) more harmful than a private firm’s. The most obvious harm is
potentially increased law enforcement or higher legal burdens
based on personal profiling. While law-abiding data subjects
might benefit from such profiling, others could be harmed by it.
For instance, if data collected on a data subject’s use of product
reveals the tendency of its user toward negligence, and this fact
significantly increases the level of care expected of her, she may
be reluctant to enable the collection or the sharing of the relevant
data with the government.53
Accordingly, data sharing adds another dimension to risks
arising from the collection and use of personal data by private
firms. For instance, Google and Amazon collect data on custom-
ers’ online reading habits and use it to better predict what users
are interested in or what they might want to buy or see next. The
51 See Margot E. Kaminski and Shane Witnov, The Conforming Effect: First
Amendment Implications of Surveillance, Beyond Chilling Speech, 49 U Richmond L Rev
465, 500–01 (2015).
52 See Larry Catá Backer, Measurement, Assessment and Reward: The Challenges of
Building Institutionalized Social Credit and Rating Systems in China and in the West *5
(unpublished manuscript, Shanghai Jiaotong University, Sept 2017), archived at
http://perma.cc/DEX3-NEY6.
53 Increasing the price paid for the data will not solve this problem because the price
would need to cover the expected costs resulting from the imposition of a higher legal
standard, thereby eliminating deterrence.
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same data can be used by governments, not only to investigate
crimes or to detect people accessing extremist material who might
threaten public safety54 but also to measure the reading perfor-
mance of students and teachers. Such information could then be
used to make decisions about a child’s future or a teacher’s pro-
motion prospects.55 The prospect that one’s online reading habits
might be used for governance potentially carries real risks. This
risk is compounded by the uncertainty of what one’s data will be
used for.
Thus, even for law-abiding data subjects, uncertainty about
the correlations that data might reveal or the purposes for which
the data might be used in the future could affect their perceptions
of the harm that might result from the sharing of that data. Such
uncertainty prevents data subjects from assessing the likelihood,
size, and type of harm that could result from the use of their
data.56 Consider a law-abiding citizen who might benefit from per-
sonalized laws (for example, higher speed limits). Should the law
change (for example, prohibiting risk assessment scores based on
gender), or should different correlations be found in the data, the
same database may increase her legal liability in other areas. For
instance, the maximal speed limit of a law-abiding data subject
who benefited from higher speed limits might be lowered if corre-
lation is found between risky driving and seemingly unrelated
personality traits (for example, being disorganized as reflected in
social media postings).57 This potential for harm, and therefore
54 See Kaminiski and Witnov, 49 U Richmond L Rev at 472–73 (cited in note 51)
(explaining how the Edward Snowden disclosure revealed such practices).
55 See Marc Parry, Now E-textbooks Can Report Back on Students’ Reading Habits
(Chronicle of Higher Education, Nov 8, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/E8NE-V5B3.
56 See Orla Lynskey, The Foundations of EU Data Protection Law 212–13 (Oxford
2015); Dustin Berger, Balancing Consumer Privacy with Behavioral Targeting, 27 Santa
Clara Computer & High Tech L J 3, 14–15 (2011).
57 Firstcarquote, for example, sets prices for car insurance for young drivers based
on data analytics derived from Facebook posts. The app is based on findings of correlation
between personality traits and levels of safe driving and on evidence that such traits are
correlated with people’s habits on social media. For example, habits like writing in short,
concrete sentences, using lists, or scheduling meetings at a specific time and place are
correlated with traits like being conscientious and well-organized. Such traits are
associated with safe driving and, therefore, merit a discounted insurance price.
Conversely, the frequent use of exclamation marks and words like “always” or “never” are
linked to overconfidence, which is associated with greater accident rates, leading to a
higher price. Graham Ruddick, Admiral to Price Car Insurance Based on Facebook Posts
(The Guardian, Nov 1, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/5MCW-5QQG. Another example
is Lodex, an Australian start-up that analyzes twelve thousand variables derived from a
customer’s emails and contacts to predict their risk as borrowers. “This includes such
details as how quickly you respond to an email and whether you write a title in the subject
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the incentive to avoid data collection, may be further strength-
ened by future technological advances that make personalized
law governance processes automatic and quick.
The government’s monopoly over law enforcement is also a
source of risk, raising fears of error or abuse. Inaccurate profiling
may result in unjustifiably denying rights or increasing the legal
duties imposed on a data subject. Such inaccuracies can arise
through profiling based on partial data or through inaccurate
analysis of the data.58 Inaccuracy can also result from path de-
pendency in the analysis. Even if the data subject changes her
conduct—for example, significantly improving her driving hab-
its—it is unclear when this will be registered in the data. Think
about a much simpler example that does not require sophisticated
analysis—namely, the length of time it can currently take to
change one’s credit rating. In such cases, data subjects might at-
tempt to strategically avoid having certain actions recorded.
Another concern is the potential for abuse of data by govern-
ment agencies for their own purposes—for example, by giving
more weight in their algorithms to features that further one or
another political goal. Indeed, the assumption that the state is a
benevolent actor that strives to fulfill its goals for the welfare of
all, free of political influences, is questionable. As analysis be-
comes more nuanced and data-dependent, it is more easily open
to manipulation and abuse. This harm can partly be mitigated by
explaining which features of the data actually played a role in
determining the outcome.59 Yet a “transparency paradox” then
arises: the transparency needed to verify that the government did
not tinker with the data or the algorithms could make the data
transparent to other actors in the market, thereby harming the
commercial interests of the data collectors by reducing their com-
parative advantage.
The use of data for personalized law may also involve signal-
ing, which may affect the incentives to share personal data. For
example, if you are allowed to drive only thirty miles per hour
where others are allowed to drive fifty, this could signal that you
line. The idea is that when all 12,000 variables are put together and analysed, it produces
a score which can help predict whether you will repay the loan.” See Clancy Yeates, How
Your Social Media Account Could Help You Get a Loan (Sydney Morning Herald, Dec 30,
2017), archived at http://perma.cc/Z83N-RE8Q.
58 See Nadezhda Purtova, Property Rights in Personal Data: A European Perspective
47–50 (Kluwer Law International 2012); Lynskey, The Foundations of EU Data Protection
Law at 199 (cited in note 56).
59 See Lynskey, Foundations of EU Data Protection Law at 200 (cited in note 56).
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are reckless and affect the commercial or personal offers you re-
ceive. Thus, specific government profiling may create externali-
ties in other spheres of life. Indeed, firms can lower costs by “free
riding” on profiling performed by the government, at least those
aspects of profiling that are observable to the public.
Finally, data sharing for the purpose of personalized law
might increase incentives for identity theft or identity switching.
An individual might seek to switch her records with those of
another data subject (either with or without the latter’s approval)
if it might make her eligible for more beneficial standards under
a personalized law regime.60
2. Intangible implications.
The use of data for personalized law could also create intan-
gible harms, which might in turn trigger negative reactions from
the public.61 For instance, warrantless government access to per-
sonal data may be seen as a violation of civil liberties and inap-
propriate governmental intervention in the private sphere. What
matters is not only what law is enforced but also how.
Data sharing with the government may also increase the per-
ceived loss of control over one’s personal sphere.62 Interestingly,
studies have shown that people are more willing to share personal
data when they feel in control of that decision, regardless of
whether that control is real or illusory.63 This implies that (per-
ceptions of) loss of control over one’s data may reduce voluntary
60 See id at 205.
61 The constant monitoring involved in personalized law may violate people’s reason-
able expectation of privacy. In Carpenter v United States, 138 S Ct 2206 (2018), the
Supreme Court held that a person does not “voluntarily ‘assume[ ] the risk’ of turning over
a comprehensive dossier of his physical movements.” Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2220. Re-
cently, the Seventh Circuit held that smart meters, which collect energy usage data at
high frequencies, may carry serious privacy implications, reasoning that “a home occupant
does not assume the risk of near constant monitoring by choosing to have electricity in her
home.” Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v City of Naperville, 900 F3d 521, 527 (7th Cir
2018). Personalized law may also compromise other norms, such as the principle of equal-
ity under the law. At the same time, however, the expectation that all persons will be
treated equally under the law does not mean that they should be treated in the same way.
Personalization may promote equality by enabling the tailoring of norms to particular
nuances. See Ben-Shahar and Porat, 91 NYU L Rev at 669–74 (cited in note 6).
62 See Daniel J. Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide” and Other Misunderstandings of
Privacy, 44 San Diego L Rev 745, 766 (2007); Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of
Law, 89 Yale L J 421, 425–28 (1980).
63 Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent
Dilemma, 126 Harv L Rev 1880, 1887 (2013).
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sharing. Indeed, the feeling of loss of control created by data shar-
ing for governmental purposes could be even stronger than that
created by the use of data by private companies. In the private
sphere, people generally feel they have some level of choice: one
can switch suppliers or possibly abstain from or limit the use of
most products, even at some cost. It is far more difficult to change
governments or to “switch off” their laws. Of course, to some ex-
tent, this reasoning is already outdated. When sensors record our
every move, regardless of whether we take any particular volun-
tary action in the digital world (for example, searching), data col-
lection is no longer dependent on our choice of whether to operate
devices.64
Another intangible harm associated with the use of data for
personalized law involves the experience of freedom. Personal
data processing might limit the ability of data subjects to present
different aspects of their persona in different circumstances. For
example, an individual may be deliberately cautious and prudent
in most areas of life while allowing herself to act recklessly in one
area in which she cannot cause harm to others. An algorithm that
treats data from all spheres of life similarly might give that indi-
vidual a high risk score, which fails to reflect how she operates in
most spheres of life. This negative externality, in turn, could en-
courage individuals to abandon or downplay traits that they wish
others to see in different settings.65 Uncertainty about the weight
assigned by the governance algorithm to different aspects of life
can produce the same result. The consequence is that people may
feel constrained in their ability to present themselves to the world
as multifaceted selves.66
Some argue that reluctance to share data with the govern-
ment might also be based on ideological grounds, protecting lib-
ertarian notions of privacy in order to prevent a “dystopian world
64 Recently, in a case involving cell site location data, the Supreme Court has rejected
the third-party doctrine, which presumes no reasonable expectation in privacy for infor-
mation that was voluntarily exposed to third parties. The Court held that this doctrine
does not apply to “the exhaustive chronicle of location information casually collected by
wireless carriers today.” Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2219.
65 For a dystopian exposition of this risk, see generally Dave Eggers, The Circle
(Vintage 2013).
66 See Yoan Hermstrüwer and Stephan Dickert, Sharing is Daring: An Experiment on
Consent, Chilling Effects and a Salient PrivacyNudge, 51 Intl Rev L & Econ 38, 45–46 (2017).
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of pervasive surveillance,” with all the attendant social and polit-
ical evils.67
Finally, the loss of universality of rules applied may also
carry psychological implications. The fact that a data subject may
be subject to stricter legal requirements relative to others around
her due to her personal traits—especially those that she cannot
control—might create a sense of inferiority and also affect her
social status.
B. Effects on Market Dynamics
Having canvassed the potential harms to data subjects from
data sharing, the next question is: How may such harms affect
the conduct of data subjects and data collectors? And how could
they affect social welfare arising from the use of data for person-
alized law? We focus on four main effects: the quantity of data
collected, its quality, the use of efficient data-collecting devices,
and effects on innovation in data-driven markets.
1. Effects on the quantity of data collected.
A main concern resulting from the foregoing discussion is
that less data will be collected. When data subjects have a choice
whether to engage in a certain activity that is recorded or whether
to use a device that collects data, they might refrain from such
action or use. This, in turn, will reduce the quantity of data avail-
able. This effect is dependent, however, on whether collection and
sharing are known to data subjects.
Data collectors, acknowledging data subjects’ potential reac-
tions, could commit to not sharing the data they collect with the
government.68 Microsoft and Apple, for example, used the
Snowden revelations as a business opportunity to leverage a mar-
ket for privacy and to market their products and services as se-
cure from government interception.69 Apple has introduced en-
cryption tools without keys so that it could not technologically
67 Phillip Rogaway, The Moral Character of Cryptographic Work *25–30 (2015),
archived at http://perma.cc/5DDH-HW8N.
68 See Rozenshtein, 70 Stan L Rev at 115–17 (cited in note 3) (suggesting that indus-
try giants like Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo have sufficient corporate power to check, ra-
ther than to facilitate, government surveillance).
69 See Katie Benner and Paul Mozur, Apple Sees Value in Its Stand to Protect Secu-
rity (NY Times, Feb 20, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/SUH2-ZA4Y; Rozenshtein, 70
Stan L Rev at 130–32 (cited in note 3).
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share data if asked to do so. Indeed, in 2016, Apple publicly chal-
lenged a request by the FBI to enable government access to data
on an iPhone despite the fact that the data was required for an
investigation implicating national security, which is generally
considered a justifiable reason for data sharing and part of the
government’s prerogative.70 Other firms may use more subtle
ways to limit data sharing, including the erection of technological
barriers to data collection or sharing.
Even when firms follow self-imposed limitations on data
sharing, data subjects might still be concerned due to incentive
asymmetries between users and firms. This might be the case, for
example, when a data collector is on its way out of the industry or
when data subjects are not aware that the collector’s commit-
ments have changed. Such self-imposed limitations are of less im-
portance if data sharing is mandatory. However, then data sub-
jects may opt for devices that cannot collect data or that collect
less data, at least in some situations. When this is the case, man-
ufacturers may offer such devices, at least if the costs from lost
consumers are higher than the benefits from data collection.
Observe that individual decisions to limit data collection
might not yield the most desirable social outcome. Indeed, indi-
viduals may choose to maximize their personal gains by withhold-
ing data while not considering what is beneficial to society as a
whole. Their decisions could also be affected by collective action
and free-riding problems, whereby each individual attempts to
free ride on the data collected on others, which might lead to the
creation of better products or services from which she could also
benefit.
Of course, in some situations nonuse is not an option or could
be extremely costly. This might be the case when insurance com-
panies require data as a precondition for offering policies or when
data can significantly reduce premiums.71 China’s social credit
score presents an extreme example.72 Under this system, a com-
bination of private and governmental data (such as defaults on
fines) are used to create a social credit score for individual citizens
70 See Rozenshtein, 70 Stan L Rev at 127–29 (cited in note 3).
71 For instance, Trustbond, a joint venture between Suncorp and the Spanish start-up
Traity, allows renters to substitute their rental bond for a lower nonrefundable fee, provided
that they grant access to their social media accounts to help determine their level of risk.
Yeates, How Your Social Media Account Could Help You Get a Loan (cited in note 57).
72 See Planning Outline for the Construction of a Social Credit System (China
Copyright & Media, June 14, 2014) (Rogier Creemers, trans), archived at
http://perma.cc/VBF6-JBKV.
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and businesses. While use of the social score is currently volun-
tary, costs skyrocket if one chooses not to use it (for example: rent-
ing a bike for 15 cents without a social credit score requires a se-
curity deposit of $30, putting it out of reach of the poorest).73
Nonuse could also be a limited solution for data subjects when
such a choice, by itself, serves as a coarse signal of the character-
istics of the data subject. Yet given that different motivations may
drive nonuse, it usually cannot signal potential offenders.
Finally, in a globally interconnected world, the use of private
data by one government and not another could also lead to
changes in data subjects’ decisions with regard to the locality of
service providers. The result could be the transfer of some activi-
ties to foreign locations, especially if the collection of data cannot
be avoided because it is required for better decision-making.74 In-
deed, in the wake of the Snowden revelations, some firms stopped
using US cables to transfer data and began investing in their own
cable infrastructure.75 This created a comparative advantage for
foreign firms providing some services, thereby reducing the abil-
ity of their US competitors to collect data. Overall, this might re-
duce the volume of data available for governance in a particular
jurisdiction.
At the same time, at least one aspect of data sharing may
increase incentives of data collectors to share data beyond the
price they receive for it. Sharing data with the government for the
purpose of governance may indirectly benefit private collectors by
reducing public pressure on them to pay data subjects for the ben-
efits they glean from collecting and using their private data.
Prominent thinkers, including Jaron Lanier, Professor Eric
Posner, and Glen Weyl, argue that data collectors exploit the
“work” of data subjects who supply data without pay, despite the
great value of the data for its collectors. They suggest a data labor
movement to force digital monopolies to compensate people for
their electronic data.76 Data collectors can argue that sharing data
73 See Mara Hvistendal, Inside China’s Vast New Experiment in Social Ranking
(Wired, Dec 14, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/9XS6-EKMB.
74 Moreover, numerous foreign jurisdictions have accelerated data localization initi-
atives that restrict the storage, analysis, and transfer of digital information outside na-
tional borders. Donohue, 4 Am U Bus L Rev at 15–18, 35–36 (cited in note 46).
75 See id at 16. See also Rozenshtein, 70 Stan L Rev at 118 (cited in note 3).
76 Jaron Lanier, Who Owns the Future? 108–09, 245–46 (Simon & Schuster 2014);
Eric A. Posner and E. Glen Weyl, Radical Markets: Uprooting Capitalism and Democracy
for a Just Society 239–49 (Princeton 2018).
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in a way that increases overall welfare should be seen as a type
of payment to data subjects.
These effects on and reactions of data collectors are also
largely relevant to the analysis that follows. We refer to them only
when they differ.
2. Effect on quality of data.
Data sharing can also affect the quality of the data collected
for several reasons. For instance, surveillance-conscious data sub-
jects may use various strategies of obfuscation, using tools to hide
their activities77 or their identity (for example, incognito
searches).78 This, in turn, may reduce the reliability of personal-
ized laws.79
Moreover, data sharing could also create adverse selection
that may interfere with the accuracy of governance-by-data. Some
distortions could arise when data may be shared disproportion-
ately by individuals who expect to benefit from personalized law
or by those who do not have sufficient alternatives (for example,
those who lack sufficient access to credit and must therefore rely
on social scoring to establish trustworthiness). Distortions in the
quality of data may also arise from tinkering and attempts to
game the system in order to gain a higher score or a “better” per-
sonalized standard.80 Distortions might also arise when exoge-
nous factors related to governance-by-data change the conduct of
data subjects. Once people understand the predictors of their
characteristics, their conduct might change with regard to such
77 For example, TrackMeNot issues randomized queries. Daniel C. Howe and Helen
Nissenbaum, TrackMeNot (NYU Department of Computer Science), archived at
http://perma.cc/HEN7-SP4Y. AdNauseum automatically clicks on all ads to obscure data
subjects’ interests. AdNauseum, archived at http://perma.cc/2BQ6-HNC8. See also Helen
Nissenbaum, From Preemption to Circumvention: If Technology Regulates, Why Do We
Need Regulation (and Vice Versa)?, 26 Berkeley Tech L J 1367, 1371 (2011).
78 See Amul Kalia, Here’s How to Protect Your Privacy from Your Internet Service Pro-
vider (Electronic Frontier Foundation, Apr 3, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/R5RM-4LNT.
79 In reaction to such tools, firms develop ways to follow one’s digital fingerprint. See,
for example, Brendan van Alsenoy, et al, From Social Media Service to Advertising Net-
work: A Critical Analysis of Facebook’s Revised Policies and Terms *89–90 (Belgian
Privacy Commission Working Paper, Aug 25, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/VZ9P-GKGV.
80 Gaming might become more difficult as the system becomes more robust in terms
of the volume, veracity, and velocity of the data on which it relies. See Porat and
Strahilevitz, 112 Mich L Rev at 1454–56 (cited in note 6).
2019] Chilling Effect of Governance-by-Data 427
factors. This, in turn, reduces the effectiveness of past predictors
and requires constant adjustments and additional cost.81
Clearly, the use of polluted or partial data could lead to inac-
curate profiling of individuals, thus distorting the norms set by
personalized laws and unjustifiably changing the level of legal du-
ties imposed on the data subject.82 Moreover, high reliance on pol-
luted or partial data would distort any attempt to establish accu-
rate standards and make reliable predictions. Observe, however,
that should the negative effects of inaccurate profiling on data
subjects be sufficiently large (for example, as a result of the gov-
ernment using other, less accurate data sources), data subjects
may avoid the use of data pollution tools, at least in some spheres
of life.
Overall, when data collected by firms might be shared for the
sake of personalized law, it may become selective, partial, and in-
accurate. This may exacerbate the shortcomings for a personal-
ized law regime arising from “data invisibles,” who do not use
data-driven services at all and are presumably underrepresented
in private and public data sets.
3. Effects on use of data-driven learning devices.
The effects on data collection we describe above may nega-
tively affect both productive and dynamic efficiency. This Section
explores the former, while the next focuses on the latter.
The argument here is based on the presumption that data
sharing will factor into data subjects’ decisions about which de-
vices to use. Assume that data collected by the manufacturer on
the use of its product increases the technological benefits for both
data subjects and future users because ongoing data collection
creates a positive feedback loop. Further assume that, absent
data sharing, any given data subject will prefer this particular
product over competing versions. Yet data sharing might change
her decisional parameters.
Consider, for instance, a car manufacturer that is collecting
and analyzing data regarding one’s driving habits in order to im-
prove the vehicle’s functionality. Should the manufacturer share
this data with the government, higher legal burdens might be
81 See, for example, David Lazer, et al, The Parable of Google Flu: Traps in Big Data
Analysis, 343 Science 1203, 1204 (2014) (discussing Google Flu Trends’s miscalculation of
flu occurrences due to reliance on a stagnant search algorithm).
82 See Lynskey, Foundations of EU Data Protection Law at 199 (cited in note 56).
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placed on some users of its cars. Consequently, such users might
decide not to buy the “smart car,” especially if competing manu-
facturers do not collect such data. Note that users will not take
into account positive externalities on others and will likely dis-
count long-term positive effects from data-driven learning on
themselves. Data sharing may thus have a chilling effect on the
spread of otherwise efficient technologies, thereby possibly reduc-
ing benefits not only for the specific user but for all other users
(given that the algorithm will have less data to learn from and
that the data will be less variable due to adverse selection).
Moreover, should a sufficiently large number of consumers
refrain from using the more efficient technology, this could chill
the development, introduction, and assimilation of more efficient
technologies that employ learning algorithms based on ongoing
data collection. Indeed, in our example, while the car manufac-
turer will likely not commit to stop collecting data completely
(given that the ongoing analysis of such data is what gives its cars
their comparative advantage), it might reduce the quantity or
types of data collected even if this slows advances in the function-
ality or safety of its cars.
4. Effects on data-driven innovation.
Perhaps most importantly, changes in data collection could
also negatively affect dynamic efficiency given that data shapes
the functionality and reliability of data-driven innovation. Data
is the building block needed to develop new products and services
based on machine learning. Machine learning enables algorithms
to discover clusters and patterns in data, thereby enabling pre-
diction based on the relationship between different parameters.
Algorithms that use artificial intelligence (AI) to generate predic-
tions require data for training. Large and diverse data sets are
the foundation of any innovation in machine learning.83
Incomplete or biased data may lead to flawed predictions
(garbage in, garbage out). Indeed, as concluded by a government
report, “AI needs good data. If the data is incomplete or biased,
83 Testimony before the Subcommittees on Communications and Technology and Dig-
ital Commerce and Consumer Protection of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Algorithms: How Companies’ Decisions about Data and Content Impact Consumers, 115th
Cong, 2d Sess 3 (Nov 29, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/6V92-B85M.
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AI can exacerbate problems of bias.”84 In fact, if the overall data
provided to such algorithms is partial and distorted, this will re-
duce firms’ ability to improve predictions, including those needed
for governance-by-data.
In today’s digital ecosystem, in which data is an important
driver of innovation, the resultant effects on social welfare could
be significant, at least in some markets.85 To cite just a few exam-
ples, in just a few years, big data has significantly increased the
accuracy of biometric facial recognition;86 reduced traffic conges-
tion;87 and increased doctors’ ability to detect malignant skin can-
cer and to more accurately assess side effects of medical treat-
ments.88 For these innovations to happen, we need data, and lots
of it.
Observe that, for the effects just explored to take place, the
changes in conduct they bring about need not be common to all
data subjects or data intermediaries. Indeed, the introduction of
governance-by-data might affect market players differently. It
might have no effect on the conduct of many. It might even in-
crease the incentives of some to share data with the government.
Yet governance-by-data may create a vicious circle in which
changes in data collection affect the overall quality of data
analysis, especially when such changes are unpredictable, unde-
tectable, or cannot be counteracted by analytical tools. In some
cases, a small change in the data may have strong effects across
the whole database.
84 National Science and Technology Council Committee on Technology, Preparing for
the Future of Artificial Intelligence *30 (Executive Office of the President, Oct 2016),
archived at http://perma.cc/9C3A-FUQZ.
85 Of course, data could also drive bad choices. See generally Cathy O’Neil, Weapons of
Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases Inequality and Threatens Democracy (Crown 2016).
86 For instance, Joy Buolamwini showed that facial recognition systems are more
likely to err in identifying images of darker skinned women, whereas if the person in the
photo is a white man, it is 99 percent accurate. Researchers argue that this is the result
of the data that was used to train these systems consisting of more white men than black
women. See Joy Adowaa Buolamwini, Gender Shades: Intersectional Phenotypic and De-
mographic Evaluation of Face Datasets and Gender Classifiers *3 (master’s thesis, MIT,
Dec 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/XP49-WF3Q.
87 See Carl-Stefan Neumann, Big Data versus Big Congestion: Using Information to
Improve Transport (McKinsey & Co, July 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/RAC7-756Y.
88 See Abhishek Bhattacharya, et al, Precision Diagnosis of Melanoma and Other
Skin Lesions from Digital Images (AMIA Joint Summits on Translational Science, July
26, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/PQQ2-9GTM.
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CONCLUSION
We live in the golden age of data collection and analysis. The
number of devices that record data about our actions, our bodily
responses, and the conditions in which we live is growing expo-
nentially, as is the volume of data that is being collected, orga-
nized, synthesized, analyzed, stored, and used by private entities.
The growth in the quantity and quality of data, along with ad-
vances in data-driven innovation, offer new opportunities not only
to the private sector but also to the public. Data-driven innovation
could strengthen law enforcement and make it more nuanced. Ar-
guably, the nonrivalrous nature of data suggests that data could
have a dual use and, therefore, that it would be efficient to extract
additional value from data by putting it to use as a measure of
governance. Yet as this Essay demonstrates, the use of data col-
lected by private firms for the purpose of governance may under-
mine the fundamental market mechanisms of the data economy
on which it relies.
The current literature implicitly endorses the proposition
that a free or liberalized market for data sharing will increase
social welfare. Furthermore, it treats private incentives for data
collection and analysis as a given. This Essay demonstrated that
these assumptions might be flawed. We showed that, once
governance-by-data is introduced, the incentive of data subjects,
as well as data collectors, might change. Even when the cost of
sharing is nil, or close to it, concerns about risks and uncertainty
and perceptions regarding governmental surveillance could re-
duce incentives to allow the collection and sharing of personalized
data. Furthermore, when making decisions, data subjects and
data collectors are likely to disregard the potential positive exter-
nalities that data sharing may create. As shown, both mandatory
and voluntary data sharing might therefore lead to suboptimal
markets for data collection, affecting its quantity and quality and
leading to suboptimal use of data-driven learning devices and
data-driven innovation.
Can the negative effects of data sharing on data-driven mar-
kets be reduced? Mandatory sharing of data (once collected) is not
an efficient solution because it could potentially reduce the quan-
tity and quality of data collected to a socially suboptimal level. Of
course, the government might also mandate firms to collect cer-
tain data. But this might increase data subjects’ reluctance to
share their data. Transparency and accountability in data
sharing by both private firms and the government also provide a
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limited solution, as they address only concerns of abuse or misuse
of data by governmental agents. Similarly, governmental precom-
mitments regarding the current and future use of data for gov-
ernance mandate a high level of trust in the government. Other
approaches may involve placing control of data sharing in the
hands of data subjects (such as Do Not Track lists), creating in-
centives to provide personal data through default rules and cre-
ating disincentives to provide fake data. Each has its own limita-
tions and costs. A comprehensive analysis of these approaches is
beyond the scope of this Essay.
Accordingly, to ensure that governance-by-data indeed in-
creases welfare, the interaction among innovation, economic
growth, and increased legal enforcement must be recognized and
carefully analyzed. Given that data sharing affects incentive pat-
terns, governance-by-data requires a fundamental reassessment
of risk to and reward for social welfare. Put bluntly, we need to
ask ourselves whether the benefits of such governance outweigh
its potential negative effects on the creation of data-driven inno-
vations, such as personalized medicine, before personalized law
becomes a reality rather than legal science fiction. This Essay has
taken a first step in this direction.
